Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

A fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The success of the treaty will depend, verification regime. This paper discusses a number of the key ve r i fication issues, e.g. the materials to be covered by the treaty and the treatment of stocks. It is suggested that a treaty which focused on the materials that can be used directly to make nuclear weapons or other nuclear- explosive d evices explode (i.e. essentially all grades of plutonium, and uranium enriched to 20 percent or greater in inter alia, upon it having an efficient and cost-effective235U or 233 chance of successful negotiation. An outline of a possible “focused” ve r i fication approach for an FMCT is discussed, based on declarations of production and downstream facilities and relevant material, verification of declared facilities and material, and arrangements to detect any undeclared production facilities. The benefits of an FMCT are also briefly discussed. U), and which excluded stocks, would stand the greatest