The Additional Protocol and the Road to Integrated Safeguards: Japans Experience

Japan, the only nation in the world that has suffered an atomic bombing, has been firmly committed to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, attaching great importance to nonproliferation efforts in order to contribute to the enhancement of global and regional peace and stability. Ratifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, it placed itself under obligation, as a non-nuclear weapons state, not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Further, Japan has been upholding the NPT regime and exerting its efforts in materializing efficient and effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Since the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991, Japan has been actively involved in the program for strengthening and streamlining IAEA safeguards both within the framework of INFCIRC/153 and through measures under the Additional Protocol (AP). Being one of the first countries with an extensive peaceful nuclear fuel-cycle program, Japan ratified its AP on December 16, 1999. For the sake of early realization of integrated safeguards (IS), the Japanese government is working closely with the IAEA and is making active contributions toward the establishment of IS and its implementation in Japan. This paper describes Japan’s experience in bringing the AP in force, including various legal and institutional arrangements for the preparation of its ratification, and actual experience in its implementation, e.g., the provision of expanded declarations and facilitating complementary access. Some issues and lessons learned in the course of AP implementation will also be provided. It further describes Japan’s efforts towards the establishment of IS and some of its expectations of it.