World-Wide Theft, Diversion, Loss, and Recovery Radionuclide Incident Analysis Based on Non-Classified Information Sources

Year
2006
Author(s)
J. Adduci - Argonne National Laboratory
R. Johnson - Argonne National Laboratory
F. Monette - Argonne National Laboratory
Abstract
Significant resource and attention have been invested in addressing the weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-issues raised by loose fissile material and stolen or improvised nuclear weapons (IND). Less attention has been paid to the threat posed by radioactive dispersal devices (RDD), despite the fact that the world is awash in material suitable for use in an RDD. While the potential consequences of an RDD are of much smaller significance than those posed by an IND, the probability of an RDD attack is much greater. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)’s International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) program is dedicated to reducing the threat of an RDD attack by securing vulnerable source material of concern world-wide. Understanding the character, pattern, and trends present in radiological source material theft, diversion, loss, and recovery is critical to ensuring the IRTR program’s success. Argonne National Laboratory, with support from the IRTR program, has developed a radiological incident tracking system to assist in analyzing non-classified incident information available from a variety of information sources. This system includes a geographical information systems (GIS) component, with all incidents geo-referenced. Detailed analyses have been completed for calendar years (CY) 2003 and 2004. CY2002 and CY2005 analyses are currently underway. Information sources include (among others) incident databases maintained by other national laboratories, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the University of Salzburg, and open source information searches. Events (e.g., a specific loss or recovery) are extracted from incident accounts. Events, in turn, are grouped into cases. A complete case documents the loss, transport, recovery, and prosecution of a radionuclide incident. For many reasons, most cases are incomplete. Several significant findings have been derived to date pertaining to the quality and coverage of radionuclide trafficking captured by various agencies attempting to track it, and the extent of the problem world-wide, the types of sources most at risk for loss, the level of organized crime and terrorist involvement in these losses, and the number of cases that truly suggest RDD concerns.