Working Towards a Security Culture in Russia: The Human Factor in MPC&A

The nuclear security community has become increasingly aware that technical solutions alone will not suffice for protecting sensitive nuclear material in Russia. Maximally effective MPC&A requires the matrix of a security culture, which includes both technical and human factors. There is a growing recognition that the motives, knowledge, and skills of site personnel and the conditions under which they toil significantly affect the effectiveness of MPC&A systems. The relative importance of the “human factor” in nuclear security is even greater in Russia than elsewhere. The old Soviet security model, based on three Gs — guards, gates, and guns – is still the modus operandi at some sites. Further, the shortage of advanced physical protection equipment in the Soviet Union and the availability of cheap labor prompted a greater reliance on personnel in meeting security needs. Personnel at Soviet nuclear facilities tended to be better educated than their counterparts abroad and work in the nuclear industry was prestigious. The high quality of facility employees and intense government scrutiny of security measures meant that the Soviet nuclear complex was well-protected, despite the absence of state-of-the-art security equipment.