A View on the FMCT  Its Importance and the Verification Scheme 

Global regime of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should evolve along with the changes of international environment. These changes have occurred actually throughout the past history. During the early stage of the Cold-War era the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was created. The NPT became the center piece of global non-proliferation regime. The NPT Extension Conference in 1995 and the 2000 Review Conference identified that the negotiation and early conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is a priority agenda. Due to several reasons, however, the discussions on the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament are not progressed. The importance of the FMCT is increased by the recent change of international political situation, i.e. problems on the CTBT, START, and Additional Protocol to the NPT Safeguards Agreement, etc. When it is materialized, the FMCT will cap the ability of future increase of nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the international community chooses the way to limit the Treaty’s scope as of future production of fissile material only, hence the Treaty does not touch upon the present stocks, it may be possible to have an agreement of some Nuclear Weapon States on the substances of the Treaty. Thus, commencement of discussions on the FMCT will contribute the progress of global disarmament /non-proliferation consideration. Many issues should be discussed on the contents of the FMCT. Scope, definitions, verification schemes, structure of the Treaty, and condition on the entry into force are some of such examples. Among those issues, the authors will discuss mainly the verification issue. The authors believe that the early conclusion of the negotiation is the most important at the present political environment; therefore authors will consider some sort of compromise is needed in selecting a verification scheme. The authors will recommend that a type of focused verification approach should be taken. Then, the authors will discuss the starting and termination points, initial inventory, verification activities against state’s declared and/or undeclared activities using routine and nonroutine inspections. Finally, the authors will express their opinions on the possible measures to accelerate the progress of international discussions on the FMCT.