Verifying the non-nuclear nature of objects without revealing sensitive information

The challenges associated with defining what is a “nuclear weapon” or “nuclear explosive device” have more recently prompted efforts to instead consider the problem of defining what a nuclear weapon is not. If characteristics regarding what is a permissible non-nuclear object could be determined without requiring access to sensitive information, efforts to verify the absence of nuclear weapons or secure weapon-usable fissile material stocks would be strengthened. Such a tool may also aid future nuclear disarmament efforts. Here we will explore a practical verification arrangement for confirming the non-nuclear nature of objects declared as such by a host state. While the existing tools, such as those used in the New START, rely on prior knowledge of some attributes of nuclear objects (such as the presence of plutonium), the proposed arrangement does not require that. Instead, it relies on a “non-nuclear template” that is constructed from a reference non-nuclear object provided by the host that can be closely examined or disassembled by inspectors. Existing detection techniques utilizing active interrogation could then confirm the non-nuclear nature of inspected objects by comparing its signature with the template. The use of a reference object and “non-nuclear template” allows application of intrusive active interrogation techniques while protecting information about inspected objects. This presentation considers application of this approach to verifying the absence of nuclear weapons at a facility that contains non-nuclear weapons. Other potential applications of this approach, such as perimeter control at nuclear weapons or fissile material storage facilities are discussed as well.