Verification of the transition to a nuclear weapon free world

Year
2010
Author(s)
Annette Schaper - International Atomic Energy Agency
Abstract
Comprehensive disarmament means to put all fissile materials under international safeguards. Once a nuclear weapon free world has been achieved, safeguards and verification will largely resemble safeguards of today in non-nuclear weapon states. The verification of the disarmament process during the transisition period poses special challenges: The problems are frequently cited by sceptics who do not believe in the feasibility of a nuclear weapon free world. The challenges include facilities that are not designed for safeguards, and sensitive information, e.g. as in former warhead construction, dismantling, and storage facilities. Much of the secrecy related to nuclear weapons seems to exceed the needs of nonproliferation and national security. It is recommended to rethink classification regulations. Other challenges are a scenario frequently cited in discussions on a nuclear weapon free world, namely a country hiding undeclared stocks while pretending to disarm comprehensively, the detection of clandestine production, and accountancy of all naval fuel.