As of the end of 2016, Albright, Hecker, Braun et al estimated 300-450 kg of HEU plus 150 kg/year, 200 kg of HEU plus 100 kg/year, and 133-502 kg of HEU plus 24-170 kg/year by 2020, respectively. These estimates assume covert centrifuge facilities. The 5 MWe plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon began operation in 1986. The reactor is a graphite-moderated reactor fueled by natural uranium metal clad in Magnox magnesium alloy. Currently, the reactor is the only source of plutonium in North Korea. In 2008, North Korea declared that it had extracted 31 kilograms of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel using its reprocessing facility and had used 2 kilograms of that amount in its October 2006 nuclear test. Hecker et al estimated that North Korea had roughly 20-40 kg of plutonium as of the end of 2015 in addition of less than 6 kg per year thereafter. They assumed that three of the five nuclear tests used plutonium. Albright estimated 23.2 to 37.3 kg of plutonium by end of 2016. Albright assumed plutonium reduction due to two nuclear tests in 2016, plutonium addition of about 5.5-8 kg from a plutonium separation campaign in 2016, and plutonium addition of up to 4 kg from possible undeclared separation in early 1990s. The difference between Hecker et al and Albright comes from the uncertainty of plutonium production of North Korea prior to 1992 and plutonium use in North Korea’s nuclear tests. Since 1994, the IAEA had not been done all necessary safeguards activities. The IAEA could not to implement any safeguards measures in North Korea in the end of 2002 until July 2007 and since April 2009. As of 19 August 2019, IAEA concluded that it has not been able to verify the correctness and completeness of North Korea’s declarations under the Agreement between the DPRK and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the NPT. This study describes the verification issues of plutonium and HEU production in North Korea.
Year
2020
Abstract