Year
2006
Abstract
This paper identifies possible new techniques for verifying declared activities at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). It defines specific verification needs associated with the basic safeguards concerns of detecting diversion of low-enriched uranium (LEU), production of undeclared excess LEU, and production of high-enriched uranium (HEU). New verification measures, equipment, and technologies that could potentially be placed in the field in the next 2-5 years are then described. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has many years’ experience in safeguarding gas centrifuge enrichment facilities. Detecting undeclared enrichment activities at these facilities has been an ongoing challenge which requires new and innovative approaches, methods, and equipment. This paper describes a variety of technologies and measures to address needs related to design verification, collection of representative nuclear material samples, onsite measurement capabilities, continuous process monitoring, continuous item monitoring, and inspection activities. Additionally, a strong effort is needed to ensure that safeguards requirements are effectively defined so that they can be physically integrated into the design of new GCEPs in a manner similar to how safety requirements are integrated. Implementing safeguards measures at existing facilities has proven to be especially difficult. Integrating the implementation of measures described in this paper directly into the design of future facilities (e.g., automatic samplers, process slip streams, in-line monitors) could greatly decrease implementation costs while providing a means for the operator to protect sensitive, proprietary information.