Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would end the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It could also include a declaration that pre-existing fissile material committed to civilian use will not be diverted to weapons use. In the civilian sectors of the nuclear-weapon states, nondiversion of fissile material to weapon purposes most likely would be verified by the IAEA using the same approaches as in non-weapon states. This verification might be phased in, starting at enrichment and reprocessing plants. It also would be necessary to verify the absence of undeclared enrichment or reprocessing activities. Here again, the same approach could be used in weapon states as in non-weapon states except that new procedures would have to be developed for nuclear weapon and naval-fuel-cycle facilities, which do not exist in non-weapon states. One focus will be on adaptation of managed access procedures that have been developed for verifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and that are being developed under the Additional Protocols to the safeguards agreements of both the weapons and non-weapon states. A final challenge will be to verify that HEU is not diverted from the naval fuel cycle to weapons use.