Verifiable, Irreversible, Cooperative Dismantlement of the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Year
2004
Author(s)
David Albright - Institute for Science & International Security
Cory Hinderstein - Institute for Science & International Security
Abstract
The verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and nuclear weaponization program is likely to be a key issue in reaching a peaceful solution to the current crisis. If North Korea were to disavow nuclear weapons as part of a broader negotiated agreement, it will have to take significant steps to assure the international community of its commitment. The process of verifiable dismantlement of a nuclear weaponization program has some precedent in the experience of Iraq and South Africa. In addition, the North Korean case presents specific obstacles. The inspection body will have to make decisions on the amount of information that North Korea needs to provide, in particular, how much information do the inspectors need about the design of the nuclear weapon itself; research, testing, and development activities; and production activities. The verification tasks will also include methods to verify both the correctness and completeness of a declaration, the role of procurement information in verifying the dismantlement of a program, the amount and type of access to sites and facilities, and procedures for interviewing officials and scientists in the nuclear weapons program. It will be critically important to identify steps aimed at ensuring irreversibility.