Year
2007
Abstract
To support inspection visits to safeguarded nuclear facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies a broad number of instrumentation, including non-destructive assay, surveillance, sealing, and containment verification measures. The goal of this instrumentation is to secure nuclear materials and technologies as well as safeguards equipment against any attempt to change content or integrity and to indicate and securely store proof of any attempt to tamper with safeguards-relevant data. Containment and sealing are a critical first line of defense to avoid successful tampering by potential adversaries. The containment vessel is as important as the seal that closes it. The net effect of ineffective containment is the same as ineffective sealing: the potential for undetected diversion of sealed materials. The severity of the potential undetected loss of containment drives the choice of the sealing method and its sophistication. However, even if the perfect seal could be developed and deployed, continuity of knowledge can not be maintained without knowledge that the containment vessel was not breached. Currently, this is left to the inspector to visually check for tampering. The containment types currently used by the IAEA can be roughly categorized into 3 groups.