Year
2002
Abstract
Some diversion and misuse scenarios may be addressed using a Containment and Surveillance Unattended System (CSUS), or performing unannounced inspections (UIs). Although the objective is the same, the conceptual approaches are different. A CSUS is aimed at detecting a diversion of nuclear material by keeping the continuity of knowledge (e.g. on a given inventory or flow of nuclear material) coupled with activities intended to detect an eventual tamper of the system. UIs are aimed at deterring a diversion of nuclear material because of the risk of early detection. Each UI is planned to identify and detect potential indicators of a diversion of nuclear material. This difference is clearly identified throughout the inspections activities carried out in each case. Based on the concepts indicated above, the cost-effectiveness of these two approaches is evaluated, considering inter alia the following elements: Reliability and deterrence effect, operational costs and costs associated with re-verification. Each element is analyzed based both in ABACC experience and in the information available. The results of a simplified theoretical exercise for the case of an existing Nuclear Power Station are presented. Finally, the deterrence effect of the measures foreseen on the Additional Protocol is examined and its significant effect on the effectiveness of UI is analyzed.