Year
2001
Abstract
The United States, the Russian Federation and the IAEA are working together to develop a new verification system for fissile materials released from defense programs in the two States. The new system will be established in relation to Article VI of the NPT. It will be based on bilateral agreements between the IAEA and each State. This effort is expect to lead to the first disarmament-related effort involving international inspections. We will describe the Trilateral Initiative, the current status of technical, legal and financial investigations, the anticipated scope and timing for implementation, and the arrangements foreseen within the IAEA to bring this new verification system into force. We will present the reasoning behind including provisions for allowing classified forms of fissile material to be submitted for verification, and the implications of allowing for weapon components and other sensitive material forms are examined. Linkages to bilateral agreements between the two States will be explained, and the relationship between the new verification system and the verification arrangements under the IAEA voluntary offer safeguards agreements and possible verification arrangements under a future fissile material production cut-off treaty will be examined.