Year
2010
Abstract
An FM(C)T would prohibit production of fissile materials for weapons and be verified by placing under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards all highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium produced in a weapon state after the treaty comes into force for that state. Disagreement persists, however, about whether some pre-existing stockpiles of fissile materials in nuclear-weapon states also should come under IAEA safeguards. These stocks fall into four categories: 1) In nuclear weapons and reserved for nuclear weapons and nuclear- weapon R&D (we do not suggest that these materials be placed under safeguards) ; 2) Weapon materials declared excess for military purposes; 3) In the fuel cycles of civilian reactors; and 4) HEU stockpiled for or in the fuel cycles of naval-propulsion and other military reactors. While the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has yet to start talks on an FM(C)T, the five Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) weapon states reportedly have agreed on an initial position that the FM(C)T should not apply international safeguards to pre-existing non-weapon stocks because that could complicate the negotiations. Key non-weapon states probably will remind the NPT weapon states, however, of their commitment at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to “place as soon as practicable fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification arrangements.” It is also relevant that the launch of negotiations at the CD has been blocked for an extended period by Pakistan, citing concerns that India might convert into weapons its large stockpile of unsafeguarded separated civilian plutonium.2 In fact, placing most pre-existing stocks under safeguards would not greatly increase the verification costs of an FM(C)T. The technical complexities mostly have already been addressed in: IAEA safeguards in non-weapon states, U.S. monitoring of the blend-down of excess Russian HEU, IAEA monitoring of the blend-down of some U.S. excess HEU, and the IAEA- Russian-U.S. “Trilateral Initiative,” which developed techniques for nonintrusive IAEA monitoring of stored plutonium weapon components. The remaining major substantive issue concerns verification of the non-weapon use of HEU in naval fuel cycles--but this problem relates equally to new production and pre-existing stocks and will therefore have to be addressed in the treaty.