Toward Some Proactive Strategies For Reducing The Risk Of Nuclear Proliferation

AbstractThe current U.S. nuclear counterproliferation framework does not effectively prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The literature on nuclear counterproliferation describes a strategic framework of four components: i) intelligence activities, ii) diplomacy, iii) economic sanctions, and iv) the threat of military force. The first and second components are proactive strategies while the third and fourth are reactive strategies. This paper focuses on the proactive counterproliferation strategies and asserts that engagement in intelligence activities and diplomacy are, in isolation, not sufficient to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. This claim is supported in four parts. First, the author will examine the existing literature on nuclear weapons proliferation and strategies. Second, the concept of<i> subordinate factors</i> will be introduced. Third, it will be demonstrated how the use of intelligence-sharing, as the subordinate factor of intelligence activities, strengthens the U.S. intelligence process to more adequately operate the counterproliferation process. Fourth, the paper will establish that incorporating the consideration of religion, as a subordinate factor of diplomacy, further bolsters the counterproliferation process. The conclusion of these arguments demonstrates how the application of subordinate factors to the proactive counterproliferation strategies - examined through historical case studies - improves the counterproliferation process. This paper contributes to the literature by extending the research on the U.S. counterproliferation to demonstrate that a more comprehensive approach is required. <i>Keywords: </i>nuclear proliferation, nuclear weapons, counterproliferation, nonproliferation, subordinate factors