Year
2015
Abstract
Tamper-indicating technologies are critical elements of verification regimes, used extensively as part of containment and surveillance (C/S) equipment and to support Chain of Custody (CoC), thus providing confidence that equipment, information, and materials of concern remain uncompromised by adversaries. Active or passive, these technologies can indicate penetration either through recognized openings such as hasps (referred to as Tamper-Indicating Devices (TIDs)), or through panels or entire volumes (referred to as Tamper-Indicating Enclosures (TIEs)). Research on TIDs has been more prevalent than on TIEs, although both are equally significant for tamper indication. Technologies have become available that could aid adversaries in attacks against both TIDs and TIEs, leaving the verification community at a disadvantage. This paper will review the current landscape of TIEs as they are applied in the verification community and address some of the associated challenges