Systems Resilience and Nonproliferation

There are growing concerns about the resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The goal of this paper is to introduce the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and thresholds between fundamentally different system states. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by reducing resources expended on outdated strategies; developing general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and other international security threats; increasing the diversity of nonproliferation champions; and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. To stimulate discussion, I put forth a number of ideas for moving ahead and define needs for future research. Developing a much better understanding of feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies will be essential. It will also be important to understand interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.