Year
2000
Abstract
In the Newly Independent and Baltic States, weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) are potential targets for criminals, terrorists, or rogue nations that desire nuclear weapons. To reduce the risk of theft or diversion of these materials, technical specialists from the National Laboratories of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducted cooperative nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) projects at thirteen sites in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Georgia. Their mission was to collaborate with their former Soviet counterparts to effect rapid MPC&A enhancements while the major upgrade projects were being planned and implemented. The major MPC&A projects, many of which took two to three years to implement, included the installation or improvement of: perimeter intrusion, detection, and assessment systems; hardened nuclear material storage repositories; access control systems; nondestructive assay equipment; measurement control systems; and material control/tracking systems. MPC&A upgrades in these countries have been completed for over two years at some sites, with commissioning ceremonies occurring at the last sites in January 1999. Since that time, efforts to sustain the upgraded systems and MPC&A culture have been administered by the DOE’s International Safeguards Division. These efforts include: purchasing equipment warranties at most of the upgraded sites; providing spare parts; preparing and presenting training courses (both at the facilities and at the George Kuzmycz MPC&A Training Center in Kyiv, Ukraine); encouraging facility and regulatory personnel to perform site self-assessments; and assisting the State regulatory agencies to develop and/or refine their national standards for nuclear facilities. This paper summarizes our program’s MPC&A accomplishments to date and our plans for continuing to sustain MPC&A upgrades and to advance MPC&A culture in the non-Russian Soviet successor states.