Year
2013
Abstract
The concept of Proliferation Resistance is defined as “that characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion ... of nuclear materials or misuse of technology by the Host State seeking to acquire nuclear weapons...” This definition has been adopted internationally as a new standard, and Proliferation Resistance is now being investigated as a means to improve future nuclear energy systems. However, this concept does not cover aspects of proliferation such as political, economic or sociological constraints and incentives for instance. Our objective was to assess the impact of Proliferation Resistance on the risk of proliferation among all factors – i.e. the effectiveness of this concept – which is critical to justify its use for the design of future nuclear energy systems. We developed a numerical Proliferation Risk Indicator (PRI) in order to quantify the risk of proliferation in countries. Our model included 20 primary factors of proliferation that were retrieved from an extensive literature review. The weight of each of them was determined through the consultation of an international and multidisciplinary panel of 12 experts. The PRI was primarily expressed as a function of the capability of a country to develop nuclear weapons and its motivation to do so: PRI = A • Capability • Motivation, where A is a calibration coefficient based on the reference case of North Korea as of 2010. Practically, the purpose of our study was to measure the impact of Proliferation Resistance measures on the value of the PRI indicator in various countries and areas. Results show that the impact of Proliferation Resistance measures on the proliferation risk varies significantly depending on the location, suggesting that a country-specific approach to their implementation would be justified from the viewpoint of effectiveness: the same level of non-proliferation guarantee could be met in various countries despite different requirements in terms of Proliferation Resistance levels.