Year
2013
Abstract
The safeguards measures provided for under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) with the Additional Protocol create a strong regime to verify uranium production activities based on broad reporting requirements on source material and providing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with physical access to uranium mines and ore concentration plants. The IAEA has, since the introduction of the Additional Protocol, developed a selection of verification approaches and techniques to identify undeclared uranium production activities, including use of satellite imagery and environmental sampling. Complementary Access at uranium mines and concentration plants can provide a clear confirmation of the operational status of the site and the overall scale of operations. However, the day-to-day production of uranium concentrates varies depending on many factors, including variability in mineralogy, ore quality, weather and maintenance downtime, which significantly complicate the detection of unreported excess uranium production at declared locations. Drawing on the Australian experience, this paper considers some options and limitations for the IAEA in using Complementary Access to verify production levels for uranium ore concentrates. Process data is used to examine the correlations between material flows and production volumes at various stages in the mining and milling process. The constraints on the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared excess production or diversion of UOC under INFCIRC/153 are compared with verification measures the IAEA could employ during a Complementary Access. New measures based on the examination of operational records are proposed and their value in detecting the various modes of diversion for uranium production facilities is discussed.