STRENGTHENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

To date the nuclear non-proliferation regime has been highly successful: before the negotiation of the NPT in the 1960s, it had been predicted that by the end of the century there would be some 25 nucleararmed states. By the early 1990s there were still several prospective nuclear-armed states outside the NPT, and with the fall of the Soviet Union there was the risk of Newly Independent States becoming nuclear-weapon states through inheriting Soviet warheads. By the end of 2002 however it appeared that the non-proliferation regime had never been stronger: the NPT had been extended indefinitely in 1995, and had now become almost universal—with Cuba’s announced accession, only India, Israel and Pakistan remained outside. Appearances however were deceptive. The NPT faces serious challenge—both Iraq and the DPRK have been found to be in non-compliance with their safeguards agreements—and in January 2003 the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT (a move it had also initiated but then “suspended” in 1993). In addition there are suspicions about undeclared nuclear activities in Iran—at the time of writing this paper these were under investigation by the IAEA. This situation raises a vitally important issue: apart from addressing these specific cases, what can and should be done to make the nonproliferation regime more robust? The non-proliferation regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT, underpinned by IAEA safeguards. Important complementary elements include restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies, multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and FMCT, various regional and bilateral regimes, the range of security and arms control agreements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes), the development of proliferationresistant technologies, and—especially important—political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This is a very broad subject—the paper outlines some steps that can be taken to strengthen major aspects of the non-proliferation regime. This paper reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent Australian Government policy.