Year
2016
Abstract
Under the sponsorship of NNSA, PNNL has been investigating options to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. Enhancing the safeguards approach may improve the ability to detect and deter relatively small- scale diversion or misuse activities at research reactors. Historically, these have been an indicator of intent to proliferate. Many of these non-compliances involve misuse and diversion, were discovered long after the violations took place, and were a part of a broader pattern of undeclared activities. Under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects low power reactors (< 25 MWt) less than once per year. Various technical characteristics and operating practices are common to some types of research reactors and could allow potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. Understanding the full breadth of activities at research reactors is important since they can provide a unique insight into a state’s broader nuclear program. Specific safeguards concerns for research reactors fall into two main categories: 1) detecting the diversion of the declared fuel (fresh and irradiated); and 2) detecting any undeclared irradiation which could be of significance for proliferation. The IAEA safeguards toolbox can be increased, particularly in the context of the flexible selection of tools for specific facilities in specific states.