STEPS LEADING TO IAEA OVERSIGHT OF ANM

When the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957, a number of elements that could be used in nuclear explosives were considered for monitoring and included in its Statute. By 1961, materials included in the emerging IAEA Safeguards System (INFCIRC/26) were plutonium, highly enriched uranium and low-enriched uranium, 233U, and source materials (depleted and natural uranium and thorium). Although considered of concern, none of the other actinides (referred to as minor actinides) were listed and monitored because their availability then was negligible. In the 1980s, with the advent of closed fuel cycles and the dominant use of light-water power reactors with higher fuel exposures, the in-situ production of the minor actinides in the international fuel cycle and the likelihood of their separation began increasing. In France and Japan, good reasons were advanced for actinide partitioning (particularly neptunium) to support comprehensive waste management programs. By the late 1980s, there was substantial worldwide accumulation of minor actinides in power reactor spent fuel, with increasing accumulations predicted in the future. The operation of two major commercial reprocessing plants, announced plans for new reprocessing plants designed with actinide separation capability, and the possible uncontrolled export of separated actinides from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states clearly indicated the need for international oversight. This paper traces the steps leading to the IAEA Board of Governors adoption of the Secretariat’s recommendation to extend international oversight to the alternate nuclear materials (ANM) neptunium and americium. These two materials are the first additions to oversight since the IAEA commenced NPT safeguards.