Year
2009
Abstract
Implementation of IAEA safeguards and the drawing of safeguards conclusions has changed dramatically over the last decade from a system focused on verifying declared nuclear material and drawing safeguards conclusions at the level of individual nuclear facilities to one that assesses the consistency of all information regarding a State’s nuclear programme to plan, conduct and evaluate verification activities and to draw safeguards conclusions for the State as a whole. In the State-level approach, verification activities are no longer conducted in a mechanistic, criteria-driven manner but rather are information driven resulting in greater effectiveness and efficiency. In the State-level concept, safeguards implementation and evaluation are based on a State-level approach (SLA) and annual implementation plan (AIP) elaborated for an individual State. State-level approaches are developed on a non-discriminatory basis using generic safeguards verification objectives common to all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) in force. Taking State-specific features into account, such as the characteristics of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle and scientific and industrial infrastructure, an acquisition path analysis is conducted in order to define State-specific technical objectives. The tools and methods available to meet these technical objectives are then specified in the State-level safeguards approach and AIP. While the SLA concept applies to all States with CSAs in force, to date formal SLAs and AIPs are being developed and implemented for States for which the broader safeguards conclusion has been drawn. Plans are underway to extend the development of SLAs and AIPs to all States with CSAs in force. The paper will describe the State-level approach concept, summarize the status of implementation and outline plans for future development.