South Asian View of Fissile Material Production Control

This paper surveys Indian and Pakistani academic and official statements on the control of fissile material production. The paper takes a broader view of fissile material production control than one focused solely on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). However, as most published writings on the subject of fissile material production control in India and Pakistan deal with the FMCT, the paper presents an assessment of the two countries’ positions on the FMCT. Against this backdrop, various options for regional progress in fissile material production control are discussed. Until its May 1998 nuclear weapon tests, India’s position had been to oppose the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) unless there was a linkage to phased, time-bound global nuclear disarmament. India now supports FMCT negotiations that are restricted to controlling future production, with no linkages to existing stocks. In contrast, Pakistan is concerned about the disparities of fissile material stocks between India and Pakistan and has argued in the CD that a future FMCT should include existing stockpiles. India and Pakistan thus face a quandary on the topic of fissile material control because, on one hand, they initiated direct bilateral negotiations in an array of security topics (including nuclear) in 2004; on the other hand, no progress on the FMCT can be expected in the foreseeable future. For a variety of reasons, India and Pakistan might thus consider regional approaches for fissile material production control. In this paper, suggestions are presented for regional confidencebuilding measures related to fissile material production control, and the role that international institutions might play in facilitating India-Pakistan engagement.