Year
2017
Abstract
Researchers and practitioners continue to study the causes of high-consequence failures in complex socio-technical systems. These studies have relevance to postulated and real events that threaten nuclear and radiological facilities. Analyses focusing on linear causal pathways are common when considering vulnerabilities in nuclear and radiological security programs. These linear pathways typically focus on individual human error or technical system malfunctions. The linear approach is limited in its value as broader systemic issues can remain hidden. A new model is proposed using an integral approach that describes vulnerability from a systemic wholeness perspective. Wholeness is a concept that has many meanings, from various academic and practical perspectives. In the nuclear and radiological security context, the move towards socio-technical system wholeness is defined as attention to multiple aspects of a security program in a continuous, dynamic process. Vulnerabilities for a subject facility or organization can be analyzed and organized using a four-quadrant framework that describes subjective, objective, inter-objective, and inter-subjective domain spaces. Vulnerabilities, or systemic deficiencies, can also be described using the metaphors of system holes and shadow aspects. Collection and depiction of these deficiencies allow for analysis, revealing common patterns of concern. Clarifying inter-organizational relationships is also important and highlights the need for clear systemic and sub-systemic boundary definitions. Improvement in nuclear and radiological security is a perpetual process that is also accommodated in the wholeness model, drawing from methods employed in participatory action research. This process involves reflection, planning, action, and observation in a continuous cycle. This paper presents the main points of the wholeness model and provides examples of characteristic patterns of concern.