SAFEGUARDS TRAINING AND MODELING IN CHINA*

In 2015, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) supported a Process Monitoring workshop with the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE). The purpose of this workshop was to present both best practices for nuclear material accountancy for fuel cycle facilities as well as to discuss newer process monitoring approaches and technologies. The motivation for the workshop was driven in part by China’s plans for reprocessing facilities. It was also a logical progression of previous work on insider mitigation in bulk processing facilities and measurement control/propagation of variance. Process modeling is central to all these areas [1] and as a follow- on activity NNSA is supporting current consulting work with CIAE to develop an in-house safeguards modeling capability. This work is based on lessons learned from the development and use of the Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM). The consulting is aimed at working with CIAE staff to help develop a similar model for their needs, recognizing that China’s goals are somewhat different being a weapons state. Ultimately, it is hoped that this effort will result in a tool that proves useful for China to optimize their nuclear material accountancy strategy in their planned reprocessing facilities. It is also hoped that it will foster long term cooperation for improvement in safeguards and process monitoring technologies. This paper will provide background on the workshop but focus on the current consulting project.