Safeguards System Analysis on the Withdrawal from the NPT

During the past review processes on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), there had been proposals for addressing a withdrawal from the NPT to ensure non-diversion of all nuclear materials and equipment that a withdrawing state acquired while a party to the NPT. If the nuclear items transferred to the withdrawing state are not subject to safeguards and are diverted for military purposes, the withdrawal from the Treaty would be a major threat to international non-proliferation and security. In this meaning, this paper aims to evaluate whether the continuity or perpetuity of safeguards application on the nuclear items after the NPT withdrawal would be secured. In general, there are three types of safeguards agreements: item-specific safeguards agreement referred to as INFCIRC/66, comprehensive safeguards agreement referred to as INFCIRC/153, and safeguards requirements under bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs). Each agreement contains the terms for duration of the agreement and penalties for non-compliance, which are directly connected to the NPT withdrawal. This paper considers four cases developed by combinations of the agreements and examines whether the continuous application of safeguards is possible in each case. The results of the examination show that the continuity or perpetuity of safeguards application on nuclear items transferred to a withdrawing state under the safeguards agreements of INFCIRC/66 type and the safeguards requirements under bilateral NCAs is secured, while it is not secured under the safeguards agreement of INFCIRC/153 type, after the NPT withdrawal. To legally ensure non-diversion of all nuclear materials and equipment transferred to the withdrawing state, this loophole in the INFCIRC/153 agreement should be closed with revision of the terms for its duration, which makes it vulnerable to the NPT withdrawal, or with stipulation of the clear relation between the terminations of the agreement and the safeguards in the agreement. In the bilateral NCAs, additional efforts will be made, as a condition of supply, to secure the continuity or perpetuity of safeguards application on nuclear items to be transferred from suppliers to recipients.