SAFEGUARDS REGIME FOR THE K-AREA MATERIAL STORAGE FACILITY AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Year
2000
Author(s)
Nancy Jo Nicholas - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Kenneth Thomas - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Diana G. Langner - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Barry Schoeneman - Sandia National Laboratories
Thomas L. Williams - Savannah River Operations Office
John Puckett - International Atomic Energy Agency
Douglas Smathers - Sandia National Laboratories
Brian W. Smith - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Jean Aragon - International Atomic Energy Agency
Thomas L. Williams - DOE Savannah River Site
Abstract
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is in the process of removing the plutonium inventory from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). The optimal location for storing this plutonium is at the Savannah River Site (SRS): after the SRS K-Reactor ceased operating in 1988 and was permanently closed as an operating reactor by 1992, DOE made the decision in early 1997 to modify the building for interim storage of plutonium. The storage period is for 10 or more years until disposition plans and facilities can be realized. The building is now referred to as the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility. Excess weapons plutonium at RFETS will be stabilized, packaged, and shipped to KAMS for storage. Shipments will begin this year. The plutonium stored at KAMS will be offered for international inspection, initially under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Voluntary Offer safeguards agreement but eventually under a new agreement being negotiated in support of the Trilateral Initiative. The KAMS facility has been added to the list of facilities in the U.S. eligible for IAEA safeguards. KAMS is only an item facility, so access to the material during storage will be limited. Therefore, new approaches are being considered for verification and monitoring of this material, including nondestructive assay and monitoring of the stored shipping container. This paper will identify the issues involved and will outline the preliminary verification and monitoring approaches being discussed with the IAEA.