SAFEGUARDS IN NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES: SHOULD MORE BE DONE?

Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear material to verify non-diversion to nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon states (NWS) however have no obligation to accept safeguards – historically it was considered that application of safeguards to all civilian facilities in NWS would be too expensive. The NWS have “voluntary offer agreements” under which they may designate material and facilities for safeguards. The IAEA inspects only a small number of facilities in the NWS. In recent years a number of NNWS have been pressing for the NWS to do more under the NPT, including accepting a wider application of safeguards. In any case, as the process of disarmament progresses, e.g. with fissile material cut-off, it is clear that a wider application of safeguards in NWS, as well as in the non-NPT nuclear-armed states, will be required. The goal at the end of disarmament is that there will be no NWS, hence the distinction between NWS and NNWS will cease to exist. To achieve this will require the non-NPT states to also be part of the disarmament process and to make the same commitments as the NWS. Rather than just keeping pace with disarmament, expanding safeguards coverage as commitments are made, a more proactive approach could be taken. Safeguards could be used to help prepare the ground, helping to build the confidence and transparency needed to support further disarmament.