Safeguards Inspection Regime In Belgium And Its Evolution Over The Past Three Years

While the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) entered into force in Belgium by the law of 14th of March 1975 and thereafter, by the law of 1st June 2005, the Protocol Additional (INFCIRC/193/Add.8) entered into force. Belgium is currently complying with amongst the most stringent safeguards references and practices. Today, Belgium has a wide range of installations and activities where nuclear material is customarily used: amongst others, nuclear power reactors, research centres, a medical isotope production facility, storage facilities and universities. This extended nuclear industry involves unsurprisingly a high number of international verification activities conducted by both Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency that form a fundamental pillar of the Belgian safeguards regime. Looking at the national organisation in Belgium, it is worth mentioning that there are no national inspections regarding safeguards. In general, many safeguards related duties have been delegated to the European Commission. The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, the nuclear regulatory body in Belgium involved in safety, security and safeguards matters has, in terms of safeguards, a facilitator role between the Belgian operators and the international inspectors. It also plays an active role in negotiating the international implementing texts and safeguards strategies, in proposing new laws and regulations, and in defining the strategic orientation Belgium can follow at the international level. The purpose of this paper is to describe the safeguards inspection regime in Belgium and, more precisely, to describe the different types of safeguards inspection and verification activities in place, depending on the type of facility where these activities are conducted, while underlining the changes in these activities over time, and especially over the years 2017, 2018 and 2019. This paper fits into the context of the analysis of the different safeguards inspection models that are applied in Euratom Member States and in other major nuclear countries, conducted by the ESARDA Implementation of Safeguards Working Group. The results lined out in this paper are mainly based on the analysis of the data that were provided by the FANC to the questionnaire elaborated by the Implementation of Safeguards Working Group in the framework of the aforementioned analysis.