Safeguards and Security for a Future US Fuel Recycling Facility

Year
2008
Author(s)
William D. Cutchins - Babcock and Wilcox Companies
Kazunori Fujimaki - Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited
Toshiyuki Zama - Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited
Dorothy Davidson - AREVA Federal Services
Remi Bera - AREVA Federal Services
Abstract
The International Recycling Alliance (INRA), composed of AREVA, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, Washington Group International, The Babcock and Wilcox Company, and Battelle Energy Technology, was formed to examine closing the nuclear fuel cycle in the U.S. through the deployment of a Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC). This paper examines some of the broader safeguards and security issues surrounding licensing and constructing a CFTC type facility in the U.S. given the current regulatory framework. A preconceptual design was prepared for the CFTC that incorporated the best existing technology design features from Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), La Hague, MELOX, and the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. All processing steps were carefully considered as were plant discharges and waste disposition. For each processing step, material flows and measurement points were established. Projected nuclear material types, forms, and quantities were determined. Existing safeguards and security regulations were then applied to determine what areas needed regulatory attention. For this review, it was assumed that the plant would be licensed by the NRC and that the facility would be subjected to both domestic and IAEA safeguards. Advanced safeguards developed for RRP will be applied to CFTC to meet IAEA safeguards objectives. This study has found that existing NRC NMC&A regulations are workable. Priorities should be placed on unifying DOE and NRC approaches, especially on material categorization and attractiveness. Detection thresholds and SEID limits should be reasonably set reflecting commercial facility environment. A major challenge will be to define the appropriate level of safeguards and provide the IAEA with the required level of additional resources. From the viewpoint of security, existing regulations can be readily met. The greatest security challenge is to unify the NRC and DOE design basis threats and provide a set of protective measures that are appropriate yet affordable for the Licensee. In all cases, a clear set of stable long-term regulations must be put into place before the preliminary CFTC design phase commences.