Safeguards for Alternative UF6 Enrichment Plants

There is a dramatic expansion underway of uranium enrichment capacity based on gas centrifuge technology. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) use uranium hexafluoride (UF6) as the process material. However, commercial enrichment plants utilizing other separation technologies may be constructed in the future. Already, a commercial laser enrichment plant is planned for construction in the United States. This plant, and potentially other future plants, will also utilize UF6 as the process material. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and DOE’s network of national laboratories are investigating next-generation safeguards for GCEPs. Many of the safeguards techniques and technologies under development for GCEPs will be applicable to any enrichment process that also utilizes UF6 (and some will also be applicable to other types of fuel cycle facilities). The technologies include UF6 cylinder identification and tracking, UF6 feed/withdrawal monitoring, nondestructive assay for highly enriched uranium detection, tools for optimized design information verification, and portable mass spectrometry for onsite sample analysis. The techniques include mailbox declarations, short-notice random inspections, and remote monitoring. In addition, Safeguards-by-Design—a key aspect of DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative—is promoting the discussion of safeguards objectives and methodologies early in the design process of nuclear facilities to ensure effective and efficient safeguards implementation; this concept will be applicable to all commercial enrichment facilities. However, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is experienced with safeguarding GCEPs, a non-GCEP commercial enrichment plant that is subject to safeguards could pose unique challenges for the inspectorate. Basic safeguards-relevant information about process and plant layout must be available to enable the IAEA and third-party experts to devise proliferation scenarios—both credible and incredible—so that the IAEA can prioritize its safeguards activities to effectively and efficiently verify that there is no diversion or undeclared production of enriched uranium.