Safeguarding Pu Recycle Facilities in Nuclear Weapon States under an FMCT

Under a verified Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) the International Atomic Energy Agency would be expected to take on the responsibility of applying international safeguards to facilities in the five nuclear weapon states (NWS), and Israel, India and Pakistan. The majority of the implementation costs and inspection effort under an FMCT would be at operating plutonium recycle facilities, i.e., reprocessing, conversion and MOX fuel fabrication processes. Studies published a decade ago indicated that the costs of such an undertaking would be beyond the resources available to the IAEA. However, the use of more recent technology developments, the application of unattended measurement and monitoring systems, and the development of advanced data analysis systems could significantly reduce both the initial costs and the inspection effort. The extensive development and testing work carried out for the Rokkasho plutonium facilities in Japan provides a basis for identifying required equipment and for designing a safeguards approach. Further consideration may also be given to possible interim adaptations of the current IAEA Safeguards Criteria when being applied under an FMCT. This paper identifies some of the unique challenges of applying international safeguards in states having nuclear weapons and reviews a number of possible safeguards approaches.