The Role of the IAEA in a World Reducing Stocks of Nuclear Weapons

All of the states that possess nuclear weapons acquired them to meet their most critical security requirements, at great cost and at considerable risk. Nuclear disarmament is likely only to come about only if each state’s capabilities remain adequate to contend with its perceived threats through a progression of reductions. Individual nuclear-armed states may decide on abrupt arms reductions, but progress toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons is most likely under synchronized, sequential steps protracted over decades. During such a transition, eight technical missions appropriate for the IAEA could serve to lock-in each reduction of deployable stocks of nuclear weapons, and hence stimulate the next step towards their eventual elimination. The eight missions are: (1) monitoring arms reductions and inventories; (2) monitoring the storage and conversion of classified forms of fissile material to remove its classified properties; (3) monitoring the disposition of fissile material surplus to a nuclear-armed state’s defense requirements; (4) applying IAEA safeguards to unclassified forms of fissile material; (5) verifying a fissile material cutoff treaty; (6) analyzing the historical production of fissile material and its disposition to come up with best estimates of current inventories; (7) analyzing the history of nuclear weapons in a nuclear-armed state; and (8) implementing a system of controls on the production, storage and use of tritium. The order in which they are implemented is not critical, although some of the steps should precede others. This paper will describe the elements of each of these steps, considerations regarding phased introduction and pros and cons regarding the selection of the IAEA for international engagement vs. the creation of one or more new bodies.