RISK BASED APPROACHES TO SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS AT URANIUM MINES

International guidance for the security of natural uranium merely specifies that “prudent management practices” shall be applied. This leaves much room for State regulators to interpret the appropriate security measures that should be applied. Similarly, under INFCIRC/153, the full suite of IAEA safeguards measures does not typically apply to uranium ore concentrates and the State must decide the appropriate level of oversight and controls to account for uranium both in process and for that finally produced. A risk-based approach to the security and safeguards of UOC is appropriate in the absence of definitive requirements. Australia has been applying security and accountancy measures for the uranium industry for more than 30 years and has developed a range of expertise for both small and large scale uranium mines. Although uranium mines present much lower risks than most other stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, Australia’s approach has been to apply effective controls that take a strong view of Australia’s responsibilities under the NPT and the CPPNM, apply high international standards but also use a risk-based approach to the collective governance of uranium. A risk-based approach must not only consider relevant threats and consequences but also consider the appetite for risk, public expectation including the operator’s social licence to operate, and the need to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden. This paper will discuss Australia’s risk-based approach to applying security and accountancy of natural uranium at uranium mines and in transport in light of the impending release of the IAEA document on nuclear security for the uranium industry.