Re-Booting Cooperative Threat Reduction 2.0?

For two decades, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs served as a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to counter nuclear proliferation and terrorism. An unprecedented post-Cold War response to fears about the security of the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy, CTR achieved great successes in Russia and other Soviet successor states, enhancing security of nuclear warheads and fissile materials; consolidating and destroying delivery platforms; securing borders; and eliminating biological and chemical weapon materials. The great strides made by CTR programs led to efforts to move away from the nuclear focus and from the Russian focus. The new focus has never been as successful as the Russian programs, and even the Russian programs have encountered difficulties, especially in recent years. CTR was scaled back significantly in 2013 and 2014 after the original agreement expired in June 2013. The United States and Russia did ultimately negotiate a new agreement, but it was more limited. After U.S.- Russia relations worsened considerably following Russia’s invasion of Crimea, Russia stated in December 2014 that it would be ending U.S. cooperation with Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom. Although work has continued in limited areas in Russia and in other countries, the future of CTR in Russia looks bleak at present. Before this new reality emerged, CTR’s successes had led some observers to raise the question of whether this approach could serve as a new model for arms control and nonproliferation. A2009studybytheNationalAcademyofSciences(knownas Cooperative Threat Reduction 2.0), argued that CTR had the capacity to address post-Cold War, post-9/11 dangers and should be strengthened and expanded. In light of the current environment, inadequate attention has been given to the central thesis of this study. However, there may be additional opportunities for CTR-style approaches, including contractual transparency, as the United States and other states work to address nuclear dangers throughout the world. This paper examines whether, and to what extent, CTR can not only be retained but also serve as a model for future progress in nonproliferation and arms control efforts, both in Russia and beyond.