Year
2017
Abstract
The work described herein is the continuation of a previously presented radiological surveillance system designed by researchers from the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University (TAMU). The initial investigation of this detection-based surveillance system, presented at the last INMM Annual Meeting, resulted in identifying some of the system’s limitations which were addressed in this follow-on work. Also, the group investigated how such a system impacted operational procedure of those working with special nuclear material and radiological sources within the basement of TAMU’s Safeguards Laboratory Complex (SLC). To better register the movement of such material through this area, MCNPX was leveraged with experimental results in an effort to optimize the system’s configuration. With a previously-developed 3D model of the basement and results from experiments with low enriched uranium, the team was able to direct current efforts: to produce an operational guideline for personnel operating in the SLC ensuring proper surveillance and, to ultimately improve the security of materials (both nuclear by using CRM-969 uranium enrichment standards and radiological by using a 137Cs source) within the SLC. This paper includes how the detectors were selected, a comparison of techniques used for testing capabilities of the system between special nuclear material and radiological sources, an optimally designed system for monitoring enriched uranium and 137Cs specific to the SLC, and a resulting operational guideline to ensure low material monitoring vulnerability.