PROPOSED FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY: VERIFICATION ISSUES

The purpose of the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is to ban production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Verification aspects will be central to the FMCT, to provide assurance that: (a) fissile material production facilities are declared and fissile material produced at those facilities is not used for proscribed purposes; and (b) there is no undeclared production of fissile material. Since the IAEA safeguards system is already a well-established verification system directly relevant to FMCT objectives, it makes sense to use this system rather than duplicate it. Further, doing so presents the opportunity to address some weaknesses in IAEA safeguards. In addition to the technical aspects of verification, it will also be necessary to address institutional aspects: which will be the verification agency, what decision-making organs will be required, and so on.