Proposal for Strengthened International Standards for Bilateral Spent Fuel Return Agreements

Though there are currently a considerable amount of international safeguards regarding spent fuel, this paper proposes the implementation of a strengthened set of guidelines in the realm of bilateral spent fuel return agreements between a nuclear weapons state (NWS) and a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS). These standards would include the stipulation that: 1) each NWS must demand the return of the spent nuclear fuel, 2) a time frame for the return of spent fuel be set according to the minimum amount of time that is required for safe transit, 3) the NNWS be able to account for all of the spent fuel that was originally supplied by the NWS, and 4) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is involved with determining the timetable and providing inspections of accountability. These safeguards would be enacted to prevent the reprocessing of the spent fuel into nuclear weapons. In particular, such a timetable is necessary because the NNWS could have sufficient time to reprocess the materials into nuclear weapons between the cooling of the spent fuel and the transport of this fuel back to the supplier. The accountability of these safeguards is critical to ensuring that no nuclear material has been diverted; either by sale or by reprocessing. After outlining these proposed guidelines and their purposes, this paper will comment on existing safeguards as they apply to bilateral spent fuel return agreements, as well as how they interact with my proposed safeguards. The Russian-Iranian and U.S.-South Korean spent fuel return agreement and the mystery surrounding the time frame of this exchange is used as a case study to advocate for the need of this proposal. The paper will conclude with a cost-benefit analysis of my proposed policies. This proposal is limited to bilateral agreements in order to emphasize responsibility on behalf of both NNWS and NWS. In accordance with my guidelines, the NWS will not be exempt from scrutiny; instead, these safeguards will prevent the NWS from automatically becoming the authority of the agreement and will ensure the neutral participation of international standards (as verified by the IAEA) within such bilateral agreements.