Year
2018
Abstract
Future nuclear arms reduction treaties may require technical means to provide confidence that items being dismantled and/or removed from a regime are nuclear warheads as declared. Because the radiation signatures of nuclear warheads carry information sensitive to key attributes unique to their nature, radiation detection measurements are often looked to as a means of providing this confidence. However, for the same reason, data collected while confirming certain attributes might reveal sensitive design information that treaty parties will likely wish to protect. Overcoming the hurdle of verifiably using unique radiation signatures to provide confidence that an item is as declared, while simultaneously protecting sensitive design data, has been the focus of several decades of research and development. Generally, an information barrier (IB) is conceived to segregate this data from the view of monitoring parties. However, a balance must be struck between a monitoring party’s ability to authenticate a measurement process and the segregation of any sensitive data collected and it subsequent analysis. Ideally, a comparison measurement and the data collected could be monitored in real time to provide confidence in its authenticity. We will present the results of proof of concept demonstrations of CONfirmation using a Fast-neutron Imaging Detector with Anti-image Null-positive Time Encoding (CONFIDANTE), a time-encoded imaging system (TEI) that may enable this capability. A TEI with a mask designed such that the pattern on one half of the cylinder is accompanied by its anti-pattern on the opposing side of the cylinder will exhibit an unmodulated detection rate if and only if two objects placed on opposite sides of the system are identical in geometry and activity. Because a positive confirmation is indicated by a constant rate at all times, a monitoring party might be allowed full access to the instrument before, during, and after confirmation without risk of leaking sensitive information.