Proliferation Risk Reduction Study of Alternative Spent Fuel Processing Technologies

Year
2009
Author(s)
Gary Rochau - Sandia National Laboratories
Joseph F. Pilat - Los Alamos National Laboratory
Robert Bari - Brookhaven National Laboratory
Jon Phillips - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Lap-Yan Cheng - Brookhaven National Laboratory
Edward Wonder - QinetiQ-North America
Michael Zentner - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Ike Therios - Argonne National Laboratory
Abstract
This paper presents the results of an evaluation of the relative proliferation risks of particular reprocessing technologies of current interest. The assessment focuses on determining whether three alternative reprocessing technologies – COEX, UREX+, and pyroprocessing – provide nonproliferation advantages relative to the PUREX technology because they do not produce separated plutonium. This study considers how a facility may be threatened under various proliferation scenarios. For each alternative, the measures of proliferation risk considered include the relative difficulty of achieving the objective, the time required, the cost to the adversary, the likelihood of detection, the cost of safeguards and physical protection, and the characteristics of the material acquired. This evaluation found only a modest improvement in reducing proliferation risk over existing PUREX technologies and these modest improvements apply primarily for non-state actors.