Year
2011
Abstract
This article explores an approach to nuclear arms reductions that would make nuclear weapons increasingly less relevant in relations between the major powers. These nations would undertake a program of progressive increases in latency calibrated to degrade the readiness of their respective nuclear forces in essentially the same degree. The program would be an extrapolation of “taking weapons off alert,” by augmenting the time required to deliver a weapon on target. If the implementing measures could be verified with high confidence, the participating nations could subscribe without compromising their relative strategic position. Nuclear deterrence balances, although less prominent, would remain intact. Under these conditions, the major powers would have much less tolerance for nuclear weapons proliferation than is the case today. Aspiring proliferators would be stopped one way or another by combined action of the most powerful states. With progressive reduction in the military value of nuclear forces, there would be commensurate reduction in the obstacles and dangers encountered in transition to a world with fewer or even “zero” nuclear weapons. “Global zero” would become an extreme condition of latency that is verified and enforced, with all nations participating either willingly or under vigilant coercion by the major powers