Year
2018
Abstract
The small quantities protocol (SQP) to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) is available to states that have less than specified minimal quantities of nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility; the protocol holds in abeyance most of the safeguards implementation procedures. SQP states comprise more than half of all IAEA states with CSA. For the majority of these states, the IAEA carries out very little if any verification activity in the field in a given year. The bulk of safeguards and verification activity regarding SQP states is performed at headquarters (HQ) and entails periodic collection and analysis of open source scientific, technical, and news information. However, not all SQP states are the same. While many have no nuclear activities at all, some are involved in activities of direct relevance and interest to safeguards, such as uranium production, nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D, or planning for nuclear power programs, or else have advanced industrial infrastructure or high activity in import/export of dual use goods. Therefore, it is worth considering the appropriate level of safeguards effort allocated to SQP states and how that effort could be tailored to state-specific factors. This paper aims to address this question by examining in particular what frequency, intensity, and focus of HQ activity is needed to ensure effective monitoring of safeguards-relevant developments in states with SQPs and for performing state evaluation. The paper considers how SQP states differ both from non-SQP CSA states and from one another; which state-specific factors could be used to differentiate objectively among SQP states; and how this differentiation might be used to vary and prioritize safeguards effort across all SQP states. Ideally, small efficiency and effectiveness gains propagated across all states in this category have the potential to realize significant benefit to the international safeguards system.