Prioritizing Acquisition Paths under the State-Level Concept

Under the International Atomic Energy Agency ’s State-level concept, the implementation of safeguards in any particular State with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is informed by an analysis of all technically plausible paths by which the State could pursue acquisition of material for a nuc lear explosive. The sequence of path steps that make up potential acquisition paths may i nvolve diversion of declared nuclear material, misuse of declared nuclear facilities for undeclared pr oduction or processing of nuclear material, undeclared import of nuclear material, establ ishment and operation of undeclared nuclear facilities, or combinations of these strate gies. Each path step, and by extension each potential acquisition path, is a ssessed in terms of the ease and speed with which the State could accomplish it, in light of the IAEA’s analysis of information about the State’s nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabili ties. This in turn can guide the setting of priorities for safeguards cove rage of acquisition paths, in cluding the establishment of timeliness goals. This paper discusses work funded by DOE/NNSA’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to explore, incl uding via case studies, practical methods for assessing and prioritizing acquisition paths.