Political Dimensions of Determining “Effective” Verification

After being largely out of favor during the eight years of the Bush administration, arms control is back in a major way, occupying prime time in international relations and the priorities of the Obama administration. Attention is particularly focused on U.S. ratification of the New START Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was emphasized at the recent NPT Review Conference, with an obvious focus on the problems posed by the nuclear activities of Iran and North Korea. In the longer term, pressure is building for deep reductions in, and possibly the eventual elimination of, nuclear weapons. In all these cases, verification is an essential and controversial component. All elements of the U.S. political spectrum, along with the international community, favor “effective verification,” but determining what this means and what is “good enough” in any particular case, is difficult and controversial. This paper reviews experience with existing arms control agreements and identifies some of the key issues that make verification problems important and difficult. Among these are the importance of perceptions and the need for more effective approaches to dealing with compliance problems.