Year
2000
Abstract
Nuclear energy production incurs the generation of plutonium isotopes. From an international safeguards point of view the plutonium element has a high relevance and priority irrespective of its isotopic composition. In all non-nuclear weapons states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, all of this material is subjected to IAEA Safeguards. In addition, the United States and the Russian Federation have embarked on a joint nuclear disarmament programme incurring the transfer of weapons materials into IAEA Safeguards. Directly usable weapons grade plutonium is considered to be of particular relevance as regards its non-proliferation aspects. For the management of plutonium a number of technical approaches are under discussion such as the energy production from mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel followed by spent fuel disposal, the direct disposal of dedicated storage assemblies consisting of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide, and the transmutation of plutonium in a dedicated reactor concept. For separated and weapons plutonium also immobilisation in glass or ceramics is discussed. Furthermore, there is a number of fresh fuel assemblies for liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors which probably will never be used and have to be managed. Disposal concepts for unirradiated fast breeder reactor fuel in Germany may involve long term above ground storage in CASTOR-type casks prior to geological disposal. The latter one may follow a concept with immediate back filling of the drifts or boreholes after emplacement of final disposal packages containing nuclear materials. In an alternative concept the packaged material may still be easily retrievable. The paper will discuss these possibilities and evaluate the problems from the point of view of international safeguards. Besides technical characteristics also political and institutional features will play a role.