Year
2012
Abstract
Progress on nuclear arms control and policies that support disarmament in the long-term are U.S. obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and top priorities of the Obama Administration. The Administration has taken action to negotiate and implement various arms control treaties while expanding its support for international verification of peaceful uses under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards. This paper explores the potential benefits and costs of a long-term phased approach to implementation of existing Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOA) to advance U.S. and other Nuclear Weapon State’s (NWS) nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament goals. Under this new approach to VOA implementation, all new enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) capacity constructed in the United States and partnering NWS would be placed under active IAEA Safeguards pursuant to existing VOAs. Furthermore, all closed down and decommissioned ENR capacity would be subject to Complimentary Access (CA) status inspections under related Additional Protocols (AP). In non-NPT States, comparable arrangements could be pursued through expanded INFCIRC/66 Safeguards implementation on a facility-by-facility basis. Placing all new ENR capacity under IAEA Safeguards is an essential first step down “the road to global zero” since the end point of that road requires universal peaceful use verification. Along that road, an essential step is a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), or a logically equivalent set of multilateral or bilateral agreements. Phased VOA implementation as described above could gradually reduce the practical barrier to verification of an FMCT. By focusing on new ENR capacity and verifying status of closed down and decommissioned ENR facilities, a gradually rising on-ramp is built which supports the desired outcomes and a reasonable transition period for IAEA budgetary and technical preparations. This phased approach enables a sustainable and incremental path to move the United States, other NWS, and non-NPT States into positions that supports verification of an FMCT and the road to global zero.