Performance Targets For Detection And Investigation Of Undeclared Nuclear Activities In The State As A Whole

Detecting clandestine nuclear activities anywhere in a State is an open‐ended challenge for the implementation of safeguards agreements because the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot control, or even know, how readily its available detection measures can detect clandestine activities occurring at unspecified locations. As a result, performance targets for undeclared‐activities detection must as a practical matter be framed in terms of what should be done to look for and pursue evidence of undeclared activities rather than in terms of quantitative detection outcomes. This paper builds on previous work by us and others to suggest how performance targets could be established for IAEA safeguards efforts directed at detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole. The suggested approach is intended to be compatible with our current understanding of the IAEA’s overall methodology for analyzing potential acquisition paths and developing State‐level safeguards approaches (SLAs), including recent developments in the IAEA’s SLA Improvement Project.[1] Safeguards technical objectives associated with undeclared‐activities detection can be thought of as having two components: monitoring for possible indications of undeclared activities and following up to actively investigate and resolve detected indications. In this paper we describe a method for prioritizing those objectives and for specifying the frequency and intensity of safeguards activities to accomplish them, such as open‐source information analysis, satellite imagery analysis, complementary access, environmental sampling, and engagement with the State. The paper includes discussion of a few fictional scenarios to illustrate how the approach might work in practice. [1] Masimo Aparo and Therese Renis, IAEA, “Enhancing Consistency in the Development of State‐level Safeguards Approaches,” paper for INMM 61st Annual Meeting, July 2020. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract DE‐AC52‐07NA27344. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLCL. LNL-ABS-819306